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WHERE IS UNITED STATES FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY GOING IN THE 1970's? 
The subject I am to talk about today is broad and complicated and 
certainly not one that anyone can do justice to in thirty minutes. Nor can 
I pretend to deal with it adequately today even if more time were available 
and your patience unlimited. 
What I would like to do then is to make some general comments and 
observations about the future of foreign economic policy and then discuss 
two specific policy issues that will come under discussion in the coming 
months. 
The subject is one which, as you may know, has engaged my interest 
for some time. From 1956 to 1960 I was Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Foreign Trade Policy of the Committee on Ways and l1eans which, I think it 
is fair to say, did some probing and pioneering work on the subject of 
foreign trade policy. In 1961, I became Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee. In that year, this 
Subcommittee undertook a series of studies and hearings on the future of 
the United States foreign trade policy which helped prepare the ground for 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the ~ennedy Round of Trade Negotiations 
which followed. 
l''ly Subcommittee is now engaged in a year-long study of the whole 
spectrum of issues that go to make up our international economic policy. 
We opened with an introductory set of hearings in December in which various 
aspects of foreign econonic policy were explored by 15 experts representing 
diverse interests and perspectives, including six who came from abroad. 
We have a rather ambitious program of work for the balance of 
the year. On tiarch 16 we will open four days of hearings in which we will 
discuss trade policy towards developed countries including such subjects 
as the evolution of the European Common Barket and its implications for the 
United States, the agenda for future trade negotiations and the roll of 
agriculture in world trade. In Hay, we plan to hold several days of 
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hearings on polic~\ towards less developed countries. At that time we 
expect that the report of the Presidential Commission on this subject, under 
the Chairmanship of Rudolph Peterson of the Bank of America, will have 
been made public, and that we can contribute to a review of that report and 
of the issues involved in this important subject. In July, we are tenta-
tively planning to hold hearings on United States foreign investment, its 
relationship to international trade and the role of the multi-national 
corporation. Other subjects will be covered in subsequent hearings in-
cluding the very timely question of the international adjustment process; 
that is to say, how deficits and surpluses in the balance of payments of 
various countries can be adjusted with a minimum of disturbance to the 
normal processes of international trade, finance and investment. 
On the whole, the record of performance in the field of international 
economic policy, both on our part as well as on that of the other free 
world nations, is one which can give us some satisfaction. This is cer-
tainly true when you compare what has happened in the post-war period with 
the dreadful experience which the world went through in the 1930's. The 
post-·war period has seen remarkable progress. We have all learned a lot 
from the lessons of the 1930 1 s. Also, the advanced countries of the 
world have managed their internal economies with a great deal more skill 
and good sense than ever before. Beyond that, we have developed inter-
national institutions and rules as well as techniques of cooperation and 
coordination amoni countries which have been invaluable. 
In the field of foreign trade, for example, we have made remarkable 
progress in the removal of restrictions on world trade and in the establish-
ment of rules for the conduct of world trade under the aegis of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The recently concluded 
Kennedy Round of Trade jJegotiations, which was conducted under GATT, 
represented the greatest step in trade liberalization ever. Similarly, in 
the field of international exchange and payments, remarkable progress has 
been made with the aarch 1968 decision on gold, and more recently, the 
agreement on SDR's -- the Special Drawing Rights under the International 
Monetary Fund. l-Je have, I think, in this field been able to bring a degree 
of rationality and sensible management to international financial 
arrangements that we can all take satisfaction in. I sometimes wonder 
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whether we have made such good progress precisely because this subject is 
so arcane and complicated that most politicians had no option but to 
leave the matter in the hands of experts. 
But as much progress as we record, there still remain many 
issues to be dealt with. We live in a dynamic world; everything changes 
and new policies and actions have to be continually taken. He can't say, 
"Stop the World, I want to get Off!" In fact, we have to continually press 
forward in order to secure the progress that has been achieved and to make 
further progress. This is what I call the bicycle principle of political 
kinetics: If you don't move forward at an adequate rate of speed, you fall 
down on your tail. 
The subject of foreign economic policy is not the hiehest priority 
on the country's agenda. I don't have to tell you what the pressing issues 
are; but, I woulJ only observe that we cannot afford to neglect this 
subject except at our peril. If we do, we will risk losing the considerable 
investment of twenty-five years of great effort and prorress in building a 
more viable economic system. The interesting thing about foreign eccmo11iic 
policy, unlike some of the other public policy issues that stand higher in 
our priorities, is that we are not talking about funding large programs 
which involve considerable budgetary and resource cost to the economy. 
On the contrary, when we talk about foreign economic policy we are really 
talking about operating in the world economy so that we can increase the 
benefits that we enjoy. Our objective is greater real income brought 
about through a better use of resources on a world-wide scale. And we want 
improved international relations -- and this is an important objective of 
foreign economic policy -- because we want increasingly to improve the 
prospects for international order, stability and peace. 
Despite our accomplishments, there are many things that remain to 
be done and many threats that have to be averted. In the field of foreign 
trade, we have to learn how to deal with the problem of world agriculture 
which has become a separate and unique issue both in domestic as well as 
international policy forums. Similarly, we have to address ourselves to the 
whole range of non-tariff barriers to trade which have assumed more im-
portance as tariffs have progressively been reduced. In both instances, 
that is both agriculture and non-tariff barriers, we are goinz to have to 
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devise new methods of negotiation which will inevitably have to deal to 
some extent with the domestic policies that give rise to the import 
restrictions under negotiation. Similarly, the subject of international 
investment has come to enjoy a great deal of attention and is one of the 
more delicate issues that has arisen in this respect is the potential 
conflict of national jurisdictions. In addition, the great growth of the 
investment accounts in the balance of payments has resulted in the movement 
of large masses of capital that can sometimes be highly volatile and we will 
have to learn to live with these. As to policy toward the less developed 
countries, the most recent foreign aid appropriations bill spells out more 
clearly than anything else the need to take a whole new look at our policy 
in this vital area. In the field of monetary policy, among the issues that 
have to be discussed will be the question of how national balances of pay-
ments can be adjusted without doing violence to the business of trade and 
investment. There is a great deal of interest in greater flexibility in 
foreign exchange rates and, related to that, is the subject of greater 
coordination of national policies to minimize maladjustments in balances of 
payments. 
This is just a partial listing and it would be premature for me 
to discuss these matters in any detail because we have just begun our studies. 
I will be better able to discuss these and other issues and have concrete 
recommendations after we have finished our work. And, indeed, we plan to 
issue a detailed report with reconnnendations. 
I want to make some observations today on the two issues that are 
enjoying little attention currently, but that are likely to engage consider-
able interest in the months and perhaps years ahead. Neither of these two 
questions has had much discussion either publicly or in the Congress, even 
though one of them would require legislation. 
The two issues that I have in mind are: 
First, the question of providing tariff preferences for less 
developed countries as a means of promoting their exports to the developed 
countries and increasing their foreign exchange earnings. The second is the 
issue of the evolution of the European Economic Connnunity (the European 
Common Market) and its enlargement through negotiations with the United 
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Kingdom and other countries. It seems to me that both these questions 
deserve more attention and, particularly, more critical evaluation than 
they have enjoyed until now. 
Tariff Preferences for LDC's 
A policy of tariff preferences means applying lower tariffs or no 
tariffs at all on imports from LDC's, even while the same imports from 
developed countries are subject to import duties. The purpose is to promote 
exports from LDC's, increase their foreign exchange earnings, and stimulate 
their industrial development. 
Some background on this subject is in order. The European Economic 
Community (EEC) has for a number of years, been giving tariff preferences to 
a number of African states and has been receiving tariff preferences in 
return from these countries. Commonwealth countries also maintain preference 
arrangements amongst themselves. The United States has been critical of these 
arrangements and has sought to diminish their effect. 
The idea that the LDCs should be accorded tariff preferences by 
all developed countries -- an idea which the Latin American countries have 
been pushing because they were excluded from both the EEC and the Commonwealth 
arrangements -- gained status at the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development which began in Narch, 1964. The preference idea was only one of 
many proposals designed to assist the trade and development of LDCs, and it 
was one which the developed countries, as it turned out, focused their 
attention on perhaps because the other ideas seemed to be even more difficult 
to achieve. The United States, making what it believed to be virtue out of 
necessity, finally came around to a reluctant support of the preference 
idea; the U.S. came to see it as an opportunity to try and break down the 
discriminatory preference schemes of the EEC and of the Commonwealth. With-
out going into the further history of this idea, it is sufficient to point 
out that a series of proposals advanced by the developed countries are now 
under consideration by them in the OECD (the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) which is providing the forum in which the 
developed countries hope to arrive at a uniform policy on tariff preferences 
for LDC's. 
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The United States proposal, for example, which was submitted on 
November 3, 1969, provided the following: 
1) Complete elimination of all tariffs on imports from LDC's 
except for those on textiles, shoes and petroleum. Agricultural products 
would be treated selectively. 
2) The duty-free treatment would last for ten years. 
3) The scheme would be applied by all developed countries to all 
LDC's without discrimination. 
4) Any LDC's that get or give special preferences would be excluded 
from the scheme. 
As might be expected, the proposals of other countries submitted 
at the OECD differ significantly from that of the United States in that they 
are more restrictive and more conditional in nature, with a number of them, 
for example, proposing quota limitations on the amount of imports from 
LDC's that would enjoy tariff preferences. It is going to be very difficult 
indeed to negotiate out these differences and to reconcile them and one 
might realistically expect that the end process of such a negotiation will 
produce a proposal which reflects the lowest common denominator. 
The question I would like to ask is whether this whole approach 
makes any sense. I have serious doubts. It appears to me that we may well 
end up with little of real substantive value to the LDC's and with inevitable 
disappointment on their part, accompanied by bad consequences for the world 
trading system resulting from the introduction of further discriminatory 
arrangements. The latter would result if the U.S. were to give special 
preferential treatment to Latin America only, as the President indicated on 
November 11, in the event we have had no success in·getting agreement in OECD 
on a universal, non-discriminatory, tariff preference arrangement. The pity / 
of it all is that we made our OECD proposal as a tactical move to try and 
break up the EEC preferential system which is discriminatory. But we could 
end up increasing the extent of discrimination instead by providing Latin 
American with special preferences. This would be politically as well as 
economically unfortunate. 
Without going into any elaborate discussion, let me make four 
points that are relevant to an appreciation of the tariff preference issue 
a subject that will be enjoying increasing attention over the months ahead: 
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1) Most economists who have studied the subject have come to the 
conclusion that a tariff preference scheme would bring little benefit to 
the LDC's as a whole. Only the very few LDC's that already have manufacturing 
capability would be able to take advantage of the scheme to increase their 
foreign exchange earnings, but even these are most proficient in the 
manufacture of such products as textiles, shoes and processed agricultural 
products, which, at the very minimum, will be excluded from the scheme. It 
should be remembered that eighty to ninety percent of the exports of the 
LDC's are in bulk, unprocessed commodities, that face zero or very low tariffs 
already. Furthermore, a tariff preference scheme that lasts ten years is not 
likely to provide a sufficient incentive for foreign investors to develop 
manufacturing capability in the LDC's designed to produce goods for export. 
2) Preferences, and in particular discriminatory ones, involve 
complex problems of administration. When such preferences are given by 
developed countries as a unilateral act of charity, they invite what can 
euphemistically be called "flexible" administration by the developed countries 
which can generate a good deal of friction. We may not be doing either the 
LDC's or ourselves a favor. 
3) There is a danger that if we do provide preferences, we may 
conclude that we have discharged our responsibilities to the LDC's and that 
we can cut foreign assistance and other programs. The net result would be 
that the few, relatively developed, LDC's which would gain benefits from a 
preference scheme would do so at the expense of the least-developed LDC's which 
are most in need of help. 
4) Any preference scheme will require implementing legislation. I 
suspect that it would have hard sledding in the Congress for a variety of 
reasons, not the least of which being that, as I have tried to suggest, the 
proposal is not well thought out. 
The preference idea is one of those political initiatives that seems 
to have come into being not because it is inherently sensible and constructive, y" 
but rather because the developed countries, faced with the pressures 
generated by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), felt that 
they had to do something. 
Actually, the United States proposal submitted in OECD, which I 
outlined earlier, would, if accepted, be an improvement over the existing 
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arrangements of the EEC and the Commonwealth, particularly if it were just 
an interim phase followed by generalized tariff reductions. But the 
prospects of the United States proposal being accepted are virtually nil. 
Furthermore,if we revert to a discriminatory preferential arrangement with 
Latin America, we would be compounding the felony. 
The lesson I take from all of this is that what is needed in our 
policy toward LDC's are not contrivances, but well thought-out and meaningful 
programs and proposals -- including policies that offer a real promise of 
increasing the export earnings of the LDC's on a durable and permanent 
basis. I trust that such a serious policy review has been going on in the 
Peterson Commission, and I hope that our Subcommittee can make its own 
contribution as well. 
The United States and the European Economic Connnunity 
The agenda for trade negotiations was not completed for all time 
with the close of the Kennedy Round. There is much yet to be done that can 
only be accomplished through multilateral negotiations under the GATT and 
I have in mind here negotiations that would produce lasting and genuine 
benefits for the trade of LDC's as well. But in order to negotiate, one 
has to have negotiating partners. Here the question is what the disposition 
of the EEC will be. The EEC is now, and may very well be for many years to 
come, occupied with the question of whether it should become enlarged by 
membership of the U.K., Denmark and Ireland and where and how it should 
develop relations with the European neutrals such as Sweden, Switzerland 
and Austria. 
There is, to put it briefly, the danger that Europe will be so 
involved over the next few years in working out its own internal trade and 
economic relationships that it will completely neglect its relationships with 
the outside world. This I think would be very dangerous and to my mind, un-
necessary. 
Yet it is a prospect that is realistic enough so that we should be 
facing up to it. What concerns me here is the following possibility: It 
has now been agreed that the EEC will begin negotiations with the U.K. in 
July. Considering the complicated nature of these negotiations, most 
observers think that they would require a minimum of two to three years and 
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a maximum of four to five years to complete. At the same time, negotiations 
will be going forward with other European countries interested in joining 
the Common Y1arket. Still other negotiations may be going forward with 
other European countries not able to join the Common Market, but interested 
in developing some sort of tariff and trade arrangement with it. Because 
of the complex character of the problems involved, the negotiations are 
likely to be complex, and what results the product of considerable compromise. 
The field of agriculture is only one, but a very important, example of an 
area where bargaining will be intense and difficult. The results of these 
negotiations will be of great interest and consequence for the United 
States as well as for the rest of the Free World. There is a danger that we 
will be faced with a fait accompli which we will not be able to influence and 
which will be very difficult to change through multilateral negotiations, after 
the process of internal European negotiations have been completed. This 
could breed frustration and retaliation, which should clearly be avoided. 
I, therefore, would enter a plea that the United States, as well as 
other interested countries, because they have direct interest in the outcome 
of these negotiations between the EEC and others, ought to have a look in on 
the negotiations while they proceed, and be able to influence the course of 
these negotiations in the interests of the world trading community. 
There are large issues that hang on the outcome of the European 
negotiatio1,.s. They will have a profound influence on the kind of trading 
world we will have in the 1970's and beyond. Hill it be the open, nondiscrim-
inatory world that we have taken such pains to construct since the initiation 
of the trade agreements program, or will it be a trading world marked by 
regionalism, discrimination and preferential arrangements? We have to know, 
it seems to me, fairly soon whether the EEC and the other European countries 
involved intend to channel their energies and interests into their own 
negotiations or whether they are prepared to undertake multi-lateral 
negotiations on a world-wide basis. 
This is not a question of whether one is hostile or favorable to the 
process of the European political integration. The United States has 
traditionally supported the integration of Europe as a noble and inspiring 
idea. Which way Europe proceeds on this course is a decision for the 
European countries to take. Of course, we have an interest as do other 
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countries in where Europe will be going and what policies it will pursue. 
But the point I want to emphasize here is that, as far as trade policy is 
concerned -- and that is what is at issue here -- tariff discrimination 
and protectionism are not necessary to protect the sovereignty of Europe and 
to generate political integration in Europe. If tariff and trade discrimina-
tion were the mortar of political unity in Europe, then it is a very 
fragile edifice indeed. 
In his message to the Congress introducing the Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962, President Kennedy observed that "The two great Atlantic markets will 
To avoid this, 
either grow together or they will grow apart." /we have to begin to think 
now about the next new initiative in trade policy. Concentrating on its own 
concerns, Europe may not be in a position to offer such an initiative at 
this time. The task, as it has in the past, falls on the shoulders of the 
United States. 
The United States Government and the United States economy are 
strong and powerful influences in the world. We have no option but to 
continue to exercise our power and influence. We can best do this if we 
develop policies that are responsible and intelligent. 
I am concerned about the neo-isolationism that is dotting the 
American landscape, for those voices offer the council of passivity and 
withdrawal that are unbecoming and indeed dangerous to a great country. 
There are too many people who have read the wrong lesson from the 
Vietnam war and who have concluded that the use of American power and 
influence is inherently immoral. On the contrary, the intelligent use of 
American power is, I believe, essential for stability and progress in this 
world. 
I have been talking about only one, and perhaps a small, aspect 
of America's role in the world, but what we do in our international economic 
relations will have a bearing on the totality of our policies in the 1.970's. 
* * * * * * * * * 
